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Abstract: The relationship between non-state actors and the broader political order is one of the 
fundamental problematics of the political informality literature. Our examination of 
informal Cairo, neighbourhoods established without planning permission, and the 
political trajectory of the once militant Gama'a Islamiyya (GI) since the 1980s, challenges 
the understanding of informal politics as taking place 'outside the state'. Salafi-jihadist 
agendas and informal Cairo have been seen as fundamentally oppositional to the state 
and political order, but at the same time have actually been quite closely linked to it. In 
some respects they are integrated into the political order established after 1952 and at the 
very least are diagnostic of its own informality. 
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Cairo's informal neighbourhoods now constitute over half the city. They are the product of a 
grassroots social movement creating a built environment from below, outside the state's 
administrative umbrella, in the face of successive governments' failure to expand the existing 
agglomeration. Since the 1990s, they have been labelled 'ashwa'iyyat (random or haphazard 
zones) and pathologized as sites of socio-spatial disorder, a threat to both the Egyptian capital and 
the polity more generally. Such discourses of social menace have been closely linked to clashes 
between the GI, which had established strongholds in a number of informal areas, and the security 
forces in the 1990s. They re-emerged quickly after the 25 January 2011 Revolution. There the GI 
exploited the absence of state institutions and effective governance, as well as patterns of 
criminality imported from Cairo's old neighbourhoods, to create parallel 'counter-societies' 
autonomous from the state. Nevertheless, by the mid-1990s the Mubarak regime had crushed the 
GI insurgency. In 2011 both the GI and other similarly inclined Salafi preachers have sought to 
present themselves as essential intermediaries between the military administration and slum- 
dwelling rural immigrants prone to sectarian violence. 
 On the basis of such phenomena, it is tempting to argue that the Mubarak government had 
lost control of its capital by the 1990s and, indeed, that the Egyptian state might be best 
understood as a “gate-keeper”,1 “controlling only the main axes of the country”.2 Discourses of 
social pathology notwithstanding, the regime did relatively little to strengthen its governance of 
informal Cairo, reverting to long-standing policies of indifference and neglect by the end of the 
decade. While the case of informal Cairo illustrates the limited reach of the formal Egyptian state, 
in other respects the 'ashwa'iyyat have been integrated effectively into the top-down political 
dispensation. Many informal districts had their genesis in Nasser's expansion of the public sector 
after 1956 and successive governments have regarded such urbanization a cheap means of 
housing low-income Egyptians. They have also maintained a modicum of informal political 
control through local notables and the clientelistic distribution of scarce public services. 
 The GI, for its part, strove from the early 2000s to present itself to the regime as a viable 
social interface between state and society. Although in comparison to the previous state of jihad 
against the infidel regime this seemed like an incredible volte-face, it was far from unprecedented. 
The GI was a component of the Islamist student movement that emerged in the 1970s as a direct 
result of the political space opened up by President Anwar Sadat. The Islamic movement as a 
whole from the 1970s reflected what Bianchi has called 'hybrid sectors',3 which combined the 
corporatized 'statist' organization typical of the Nasser years with more 'purely' informal or 
'pluralist' sectors. Some student groups, such as the Shabab Islam (Youth of Islam), were regime 
creations, whereas others, like the Gama'at that emerged after 1974 enjoyed more independence.4 
Later the GI straddled the boundary between being encouraged, tolerated and illegal. Since the 
fall of Mubarak in February 2011, the GI has sought to position itself as an interface between the 
state and society for the purposes of moral guidance, education and the maintenance of social 
peace. 
 Hence both informal Cairo and the GI can be seen as standing in a similar relationship to 
the Egyptian state. Their informality is not entirely antagonistic or external to it, but in part 
derives from the informal means through which power has been exercised since 1952, and is 
closely related to a regional political economy that facilitated the transnational flow of money and 
ideas. This contention will be elaborated in what follows, beginning with a brief interpretive 
discussion of the problematics of locating informality vis-à-vis the Egyptian state. It will be 
followed by a discussion of informal housing in Cairo and the political trajectory of the GI. 
 
States of Informality 
 
As Grzymala-Busse5 notes, the informal sector, broadly speaking societal activities and practices 
unregulated by the state,6 is not free-standing social space, but must be studied within a broader 
state and institutional context. In Egypt, the informal sector must be seen as embedded in a highly 
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top-down state and authoritarian political order in place since the Free Officers' seizure of power 
in 1952 and subsequent establishment of the Nasser regime. 
 
A Lame Leviathan? 
 
Students of Egyptian politics have commonly depicted the post-1952 state as a bureaucratic 
administrative Leviathan, penetrating into the depths of Egyptian society by virtue of the state-led 
development approach begun in earnest after 1956.7 This state and political economy have been 
the basis for a highly authoritarian political order. Egypt has been ruled by a succession of 
“presidential monarchs” atop a coalition of dependent groups including the military, security 
forces, public sector bureaucracy and since Sadat's economic opening of the 1970s, and 
particularly following neoliberal reforms in the 1990s crony capitalists.8 Economic opening was 
also accompanied by a measure of political liberalization. Nasser's successors Sadat and Mubarak 
tolerated a degree of political pluralism and façade democracy. Nonetheless the president and 
political elite have continued to monopolize formal political life and preferential access to state 
spoils, wielding power through an informal politics of clientelism and personal rule.9 Until 
recently this dispensation of power has proven highly resilient in the face of internal and external 
challenges.10 
 But for some decades scholars have been considerably more skeptical about the regime's 
capacity to govern Egyptian society: to penetrate and mobilize it in the service of its 
modernization and developmental goals, and even regulate society in the grassroots and on the 
periphery.11 Critics noted, for example, that state agencies were often underfunded and deployed 
as tools of devolved patronage and intra-elite political competition, sapping their capacity to make 
and implement policy. At the local level, the state bureaucracy was often too closely tied to local 
notables, part of a strategy for integrating these elites into the political order, further diminishing 
its capacity to foster social change and creating opportunities for bottom-up rent-seeking. Finally, 
Egyptian rulers since Nasser have been unwilling to risk the potential upheavals entailed in the 
top-down mobilization of Egyptian society in the service of state-led national development. A 
desire to maintain social peace resulted in political stagnation.12  
 Hence the Egyptian state is probably best understood as a “Lame Leviathan”: 
“domineering and authoritarian” but also “ineffective, rickety, and porous”.13 Such capacity as it 
has been able to muster has often been externally generated. With only limited ability to promote 
growth in the Egyptian economy and extract the resulting surplus from society, regimes since 
1952 have frequently relied on various kinds of externally generated income.14 The Nasser regime 
embarked upon its state-building and state-led development experiment with a combination of 
Soviet military and industrial development assistance, American food aid and commercial credits. 
The Sadat and Mubarak regimes had access to approximately $160 billion in the 1974-2009 
period in oil revenues and Suez Canal receipts. The Egyptian economy also received essential 
foreign exchange in the form of approximately $200 billion in tourism revenues and remittances 
from Egyptians employed overseas.15 Most politically visible, of course, has been the extensive 
support from western patrons, notably the United States. Since 1974 Washington has provided 
roughly $45 billion in “strategic rents” reflecting its position as the principal guarantor of the 
Israeli-Egyptian Camp David peace agreements, but also Egypt's status as a key regional 
ally/client.16 So while Egypt is not a “rentier state” in the classical sense since its economy is too 
diversified with external rents now a relatively small proportion of GDP nonetheless state and 
economy rely on exogenous income for a substantial degree of their capacity. 
 There is probably no single explanation for the contemporary Egyptian state's lack of 
internal capacity. One salient factor is likely a history of dependent state formation.17 Although 
never formally colonized, Egypt was subject to repeated British interventions throughout the 19th 
century, eventually being occupied from 1882 to 1952. From the mid-19th century onward Egypt 
was integrated into world markets as a mono-crop cotton exporter. While the Egyptian state 
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played a crucial role in fostering the cotton export political economy, mainly by supporting the 
'primitive accumulation' of the gentry, it never acquired more than a limited penetrative capacity 
in Egyptian society.18  Egyptian nationalist historians, moreover, have accused Britain of seeking 
to obstruct domestic industrialization.19 There has also been a robust debate amongst scholars as 
to whether Egyptian social elites often non-Egyptian expatriates and mainly located in the cotton 
and ancillary sectors supported such development.20 But whatever the specific reasons for the 
Egyptian state's capacity problems, there is a plausible case to be made that the Egyptian state 
lacked the necessary institutional and financial resources for the post-1952 state-building 
endeavour simply by virtue of its predominantly agricultural development trajectory up to that 
point.21 
 The political dispensation in place since 1952 is a key explanatory factor for 
understanding the limited 'reach' and capacity of the Egyptian state. As Michael Mann has 
insightfully argued, autocratic political orders are rich in unilateral “despotic” capacity vis-à-vis 
the societies they rule but weaker with respect to the “infrastructural” power needed to govern 
them and implement policies effectively.22 Thus the Egyptian state's rule of much of Egyptian 
society may be described in terms of a “politics of neglect” in which the logic of authoritarian 
power relations undermines its governance capacities.23 For example, the inability of state 
agencies to penetrate Egyptian society and consequent reliance on local notables may be 
understood in terms of excessive transaction costs, in the absence of a compliant and consenting 
citizenry. Pre-existing patrimonial and clientalist structures have served in place of developing 
new bureaucratic capacity on a legal-rational basis. But this informal control, reliant as it is on 
patronage, leaves those excluded from state largesse able to develop the infrastructural and 
ideological capacity to flaunt, and oppose, state dictums. In recognition of this abiding danger, 
Egypt's rulers have tended to leave much of society to its own devices via a politics of risk 
avoidance that eschews interventions likely to catalyze bottom-up opposition.24 
 In short, the same factors which have reproduced the post 1952 political order and aided 
its durability have severely constrained the governance capacities of the Egyptian state. The latter 
can be reasonably depicted as a “gate-keeper” state, in control of access to the outside world as 
well as the main internal lines of communication but only able to “[annexe]” the rest of society 
“from the outside”.25 With limited capacity to govern in the rural and urban grassroots, Egyptian 
governments have frequently ruled what are otherwise “self-managing communities” through 
local notables and other allies on the ground, including seeking to co-opt elements of the Islamist 
movement to play the intermediary role.26 The GI, for its part, was tolerated and even encouraged 
in the 1980s on the understanding that it confines itself to Upper Egypt, remain small enough not 
to pose a threat and not too obviously compromise the state's monopoly on violence.27 
 
Autonomy of the Informal? 
 
It is hence quite possible to see the Egyptian informal sector as embodying a broader state- 
society disengagement grounded both in state weakness and the self-absorbed character of 
patrimonial political order. Not only is informality by definition resistant to state control, but also 
such notions of disengagement are suggestive of a stronger claim that the informal sector is 
somehow external to and (at least potentially) autonomous from the broader political order, 
populated by those who desire “to run their own affairs, without involving the authorities or other 
modern formal institutions.”28 In some scholarly accounts, informality is the manifestation of a 
bottom-up popular agency providing ordinary Egyptians with the resources to contest their 
exclusion from formal politics.29 
 While lacking the capacity to extract social surplus directly and efficiently from the 
Egyptian countryside, the state's efforts at indirect extraction from the agrarian sector had a highly 
negative long-term impact on Egyptian farmers.30 Despite its quite limited 'reach', it thus 
nonetheless has had considerable weight, for example by employing roughly a third of the work 
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force in the 1980s and paying two thirds of the wage bill.31 So despite claims that the putative 
economic reforms of the 1990s marked the end of the Nasserist 'social contract',32 in which state 
social welfare spending was used to demobilize Egyptian society, the 'clientalization' of Egyptian 
society likely continued as access to state goods and services 'trickled down' (however indirectly 
and inequitably) into the grassroots. At the risk of abusing the metaphor, the state remains a 'gate-
keeper' for things that many Egyptians want. Hence they are unlikely to regard the informal sector 
as a complete substitute for the formal system, for example resorting to informal types of conflict 
resolution in some situations and seeking redress in the courts in others depending on the 
circumstances.33 
 Thus the nature of the Egyptian informal sector reflects a state that is frequently 
incompetent but rarely absent from Egyptian society entirely. Informality occupies an ambiguous 
middle ground between its nominally regulated sectors and those zones explicitly branded as 
deviant or insurgent.34 Although subject to routine harassment and perhaps intermittent sanctions, 
informal actors and activities tend not to be suppressed systematically unless they become highly 
visible. In other words, they generally evade the law without being definitively branded as 
outlaw.35 Not only may state officials effectively tolerate what they are unable to stop, de facto 
socio-political pluralism is not necessarily a challenge to the Egyptian state. It has often accepted 
the Islamist provision of welfare services and extra-state dispute- resolution systems as a shield 
from the bottom-up demands of Egyptian society. 
 Finally, informality in an Egyptian context may be understood as political integration by 
other means. By virtue of its ambiguous legal status and dependence on state tolerance, the 
informal sector is particularly vulnerable to top-down sanctions. Indeed, de facto state toleration 
may, ironically, give it a stake in the preservation of the status quo. While in some respects the 
informal may stand outside the clientelization process, it is nonetheless not immune to it. Informal 
institutions and practices in Egypt have often been linked to gaining access to various kinds of 
state goods and services.36 
 For these reasons, it is problematic to see the informal sector as a potential source of 
autonomous social power standing in opposition to the state. With respect to the Middle East 
more generally, the informal sector's visible political challenge has been limited, with its 
constituents being least likely to engage in “openly political activities directed against the state.”37 
Rather than posing a bottom-up challenge to the post-1952 order in Egypt, informality may thus 
be sometimes diagnostic of its reproduction and durability. 
 
The Politics of Neglect in Cairo 
 
The case of informal Cairo exemplifies the ambiguous and problematic notion of informality 
presented here. A zone outside the umbrella of state planning and administration, nonetheless 
state agencies and institutions are implicated in its genesis and development. Branded an 
oppositional space in the early 1990s, the 'ashwa'iyyat are clearly integrated into the political 
dispensation at a number of levels. 
 
Origins of Informal Cairo 
 
Informal urbanization in Cairo reflects the Egyptian state's inability to manage the growth of its 
capital. Since the 1950s, it has become a mega-city having expanded rapidly from a population of 
2 million in 1950 to as many as 18 million currently. However there has been no corresponding 
expansion of the existing agglomeration since the 1950s. Private urban development began to end 
in 1952,38 and the Nasser regime constructed only showpiece neighbourhoods (Madinat Nasr, 
Mohandiseen) for its supporters. Indeed, it made a deliberate, albeit ineffective, effort to divert 
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investment out of housing and into industry.39 While both the Sadat and Mubarak governments 
subsequently sought to 'deconcentrate' Cairo through the construction of new cities, some close by 
on the city periphery and others at a distance, they have not constituted a plausible alternative to 
the existing agglomeration.40 
Hence the demographic pressures on the capital have been expressed informally. From the mid-
1960s, the lack of new sub-divisions resulted in a steady inflation of land and housing costs.41 
Increasingly priced out of the formal housing sector, Egyptians began to purchase farmland on the 
city periphery, which was substantially cheaper as it lacked planning permission and services, for 
sub-division and development.42 The result was something of a grassroots demographic 
movement on the part of young families and others looking to improve their housing stock, 
leaving the capital's overcrowded and decaying historic neighbourhoods in favour of 
homesteading in the Giza sprawl and in north Cairo.43 While such communities are sometimes 
described in the Francophone academic literature as 'spontaneous,' they are not without a certain 
socio-spatial order. Spatially, their development has tended to follow the pattern of the original 
field boundaries and these neighbourhoods have had a distinct and predictable growth trajectory 
of first horizontal and then vertical densification.44 In the absence of formal planning, their growth 
and development has been largely driven by the market exigencies of land prices and the 
availability of capital (often remitted by Egyptians employed overseas). 
 By definition, informal communities lack planning and servicing (at least at the outset). 
The largely market logic of their development means that there are few land set- asides into which 
infrastructure may be added retrospectively. Such factors make for a difficult and sometimes 
unpleasant built environment. But, informal Cairo is not marginal housing. In 2000, its 
neighbourhoods represented 53 percent of Cairo's dwelling units and housed 62 percent of the 
population.45 The bulk of them are built on arable land although there are at least two other 
distinct building morphologies: informal neighbourhoods 'squatting' publicly owned 
desert/mountain land as well as old farming villages and other sites of uncertain status and tenure, 
absorbed into the existing formal agglomeration, which have been developed informally. 
 Whatever their differences, all such neighbourhoods constitute a substantial zone of the 
Egyptian capital where the state's administrative fiat does not hold sway. Landownership is not 
immediately problematic, the plots having been privately purchased, nonetheless the urbanization 
of arable land is in violation of numerous laws and decrees; it has also been criticized as a threat 
to Egypt's scarce supply of arable land. While informal Cairo is not entirely without state-
provided infrastructure, nonetheless the state regulatory and service provision role is often so 
limited that one western student of the city has declared: “Basically Cairo manages itself—the 
state is largely irrelevant.”46 
 
'The Islamic Republic of Imbaba' 
 
Such sweeping views were certainly correct through the late 1980s when the state response to 
informal Cairo was largely one of indifference and neglect.47 There were ample indications that 
state officials were at least periodically aware of such areas, but there was little relish for 
confronting an issue that already exceeded the resources of the state. The stigmatizing discourse 
of the informal as 'ashwa'iyyat a threat to the broader polityhas its origins in the clashes between 
the state security forces and the Gama'a Islamiyya (GI) militants who had established themselves 
in a number of Cairo informal neighbourhoods in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
 The most notable of these clashes was the 'Siege of Imbaba' in December 1992 in which 
the Mubarak government suppressed the so-called 'Islamic Republic of Imbaba,' proclaimed by 
the militants in the North Giza neighbourhood of Mounira Gharbiyya. The confrontation has been 
subject to varying interpretations. In some accounts it was the climax of an Islamist effort to 
infiltrate informal Cairo for use as a base of operations in the attempt to overthrow of the 
Mubarak government.48 In other interpretations, it was rather the intensification of an urban 
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guerrilla campaign provoked by the Mubarak regime's unwillingness to tolerate the existence of a 
GI-controlled counter-society in Mounira Gharbiyya.49 In any event, when Reuters press agency 
filed a story about the Islamic Republic of Imbaba, the sting of international humiliation, through 
the affirmation that Egyptian sovereignty was in some ways incomplete or qualified, proved to be 
the final straw for the regime, provoking the heavy- handed assertion of the state's monopoly on 
violence.50 
 The decision to suppress the GI also probably reflected the broader difficulties the regime 
then faced in Cairo. An October 1992 earthquake had killed hundreds, displaced tens of thousands 
and done highly visible damage to poorly constructed public-sector infrastructure and formal 
sector buildings. The state response to the quake had been feeble, especially compared to relief 
efforts mounted by the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist charities (Al-Awadi 2003). 
Displaced Cairenes took to the streets to demand housing and assistance. The government was 
subject to scathing criticism in the normally tame opposition press and controlled legislature.51 In 
one account, the state's failure to deal adequately with the earthquake was said to have encouraged 
Islamists to proclaim the Imbaba 'republic' in direct challenge to the Mubarak government.52 
Such events dramatically illustrated the Egyptian state's manifest shortcomings of urban 
governance, even suggesting that it was losing control of its capital. Informal Cairo provided a 
convenient scapegoat for such broader dysfunctions with the state- sanctioned 'ashwa'iyyat 
discourse portraying it as an objectification of urban disorder, stigmatizing its inhabitants as 
uncivilized peasants in need of rehabilitation and moral guidance and depicting it as hence a 
hotbed of terrorism.53 These stereotypes of social pathology seemed to offer the authorities 
essentially a blank cheque to undertake whatever measures against the informal housing sector 
they saw fit. 
One crucial trope in this discourse was that informal Cairo was outside state control with the GI 
exploiting “the political, social and security vacuum,” caused by the government's failure both to 
assert its presence and develop the area.54 Reportage during the Siege of Imbaba stressed the need 
for the state to assert its presence and to deny the GI refuge.55  Even some years later, a leftist 
writer asserted that the area still remained self-sufficient and detached, hence continuing to defy 
state authority on an everyday level.56 Ironically, such views were echoed in some western 
academic writings on informal Cairo, portraying its neighbourhoods as “spheres of dissidence” 
and arguing that Islamist “implantation” had succeeded by virtue of the militants managing to 
“anchor themselves in oppositional spaces already formed or in formation” by virtue of state 
absence and their (at least partial) autonomy.57 
 The 'ashwa'iyyat discourse signalled what appeared to be a decisive shift in the Egyptian 
state's dealing with informal Cairo. Informal neighbourhoods no longer appeared to be an 
ambiguous tolerated space, but rather actively oppositional to the formal political order and to be 
dealt with as such. In this spirit, during Spring 1993 state officials announced a series of measures 
aimed at dealing with informal Cairo. These included the demolition of approximately sixteen 
settlements, mostly of the small 'squatter pocket' variety, and the systematic rehabilitation of 
dozens more including the construction of police stations and other measures to facilitate state 
access.58 In Summer 1996, the Mubarak government announced that further informal settlement 
of agricultural land would be prosecuted in the military courts, a tactic employed against 
Islamists.59 
 Some two decades after the siege of Imbaba the pathologisation of informal 
neighbourhoods continues, well-illustrated during recent sectarian violence in Imbaba. The nature 
of these events, in which a Coptic woman Abir Fakhri had allegedly converted to Islam and been 
imprisoned by the Coptic church remain shrouded in controversy and rumour. But irrespective of 
what actually happened, the discourse reveals clear continuity in the assumptions of the 
metropolitan elite. Thus for Amr Hamzawy, a prominent participant in the 2011 Revolution and 
long-time democracy advocate, 'in Imbaba, inhuman economic and social conditions make it 
inevitable that an environment nurturing violence will prevail and speeches of incitement against 
the religious other will be accepted'.60 
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 Hamzawy was one of several respected intellectuals that contributed to compiling the 
report of the National Council for Human Rights (NCHR) on the Imbaba affair. The report, in 
many respects a measured attempt to defuse the hysteria and rumour- mongering about the events, 
nevertheless plays into the established pathologies about Imbaba and the 'ashwa'iyyat. The report 
notes, by way of setting the scene and providing a context for readers to interpret the events, that 
after some citizens gathered outside the church in the hope of rescuing Abir, “there gathered 
around them some thugs and simpletons of the area (ba'd ahali al-mintaqa min qalilay al-wa'i wa-
al-baltajiyya).”  It goes on to note that “the area around the Mar Mina church has a special 
character. There live there citizens who come originally from the Sa'id and the culture of carrying 
guns and munitions is widespread among them.” The report ends with a short section entitled 'The 
Specificity of the Theatre of Events' which notes that the violence can be blamed on “the 
predominance of the haphazard ['ashwa'i] model, the absence of basic services and the 
overcrowding and the widespread unemployment and the absence of public authorities.” This 
social context is what triggers sectarian violence amongst peoples sensitive to any issue pertaining 
to “honour, religion or both” (Ali 2011).61 Among the report's recommendations is that the 
sovereignty of law and of the state of institutions be affirmed in Imbaba, and that institutions of 
state, and not 'individuals and groups' take responsibility for the maintenance of security in the 
area. 
 
The resumption of neglect? 
 
The aftermath of the siege of Imbaba, suggests that implementing the recommendations of the 
NCHR may pose a significant challenge to the new Egyptian leadership. While the 'ashwa'iyyat 
discourse in the 1990s was suggestive of a 'hard' Egyptian state finally ready to take decisive 
action against a direct security threat, implementation of these urban development initiatives was 
more in keeping with capacities of a Lame Leviathan. Although state coercive capacity had 
effectively demobilized and expelled the GI, state agencies lacked capacity to demolish or 
upgrade supposedly dilapidated and threatening areas systematically. 
 With respect to demolitions, the state continued to lack the resources to re-house those 
who would be displaced in large-scale clearances and was unwilling, on security grounds, to 
contemplate large-scale removals without some element of compensation.62 The threat of military 
prosecutions was eventually abandoned in 2004, ironically because its non-enforcement was 
actually encouraging informal urbanization.63 The Egyptian financed upgrading undertaken after 
1992 was confined to a showpiece project in Mounira Gharbiyya. More systematic urban-
development interventions continued to be largely funded by western aid agencies, with little 
indication that Egyptian state agencies had the capacity to normalize the still rapidly expanding 
informal housing sector through service provision.64 
 Such indisputable resource constraints are suggestive of the contention that Cairo's 
neglect is a consequence of the long-term underdevelopment of the Egyptian state and economy. 
Despite the long-term tendency of Egyptian governments to refrain from systematic interventions 
in their capital, the situation since the 1970s differs in at least one important respect. Since Sadat's 
economic and political opening to the West, western aid agencies have undertaken urban 
development projects in the capital and sought to foster an administratively competent Egyptian 
state capable of governing its capital. However such initiatives have been repeatedly obstructed 
and subverted by Egyptian state agencies which, while eager to lay their hands on western 
development funding, have resisted donor efforts to make them take a more activist and 
interventionist approach to Cairo's governance.65 
 Thus the 1990s and subsequent decades continued to be characterized by an informal 
politics of toleration. The Mubarak government resisted direct interventions which might have 
engendered demands for representation and political participation while nonetheless ensuring that 
informal Cairo remained integrated into the political order by other means. Indeed, informal Cairo 
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has been closely associated with the Egyptian state, in the sense of its under-the-surface de facto 
workings, from its inception. While such urbanization has rarely been formally sanctioned, it 
nonetheless frequently 'piggy- backed' off the infrastructure installed for formal neighbourhoods 
or public-sector factories. In some cases, the Cairo authorities have tolerated, and even tacitly 
encouraged, particular settlements as a low cost means of housing low income Egyptians. Some 
observers have suggested that the very category of 'informal' has served as a means of rationing 
the very limited state spending on municipal infrastructure, a spending that has often likely been 
in the form of top-down patronage. Hence, there are ample indications that rather than being a 
zone of dissidence, informal areas have long been incorporated into the political dispensation 
through a clientelistic micro-politics of service acquisition.66 Thus the 1990s and subsequent 
decades continued to be characterized by an informal politics of toleration. The Mubarak 
government resisted direct interventions which might have engendered demands for 
representation and political participation while nonetheless ensuring that informal Cairo remained 
integrated into the political order by other means. Indeed, informal Cairo has been closely 
associated with the Egyptian state, in the sense of its under-the-surface de facto workings, from its 
inception. While such urbanization has rarely been formally sanctioned, it nonetheless frequently 
'piggy- backed' off the infrastructure installed for formal neighbourhoods or public-sector 
factories. In some cases, the Cairo authorities have tolerated, and even tacitly encouraged, 
particular settlements as a low cost means of housing low income Egyptians. Some observers 
have suggested that the very category of 'informal' has served as a means of rationing the very 
limited state spending on municipal infrastructure, a spending that has often likely been in the 
form of top-down patronage. Hence, there are ample indications that rather than being a zone of 
dissidence, informal areas have long been incorporated into the political dispensation through a 
clientelistic micro-politics of service acquisition.67 
 
The Gama'a Islamiyya between Informality and the State 
 
The challenge the post-Mubarak governments will face is magnified by the fact that societal 
actors in Egypt are also socialised to informality. The challenge of realising a more democratic or 
equitable future in Egypt is thus not just a question of the state's 're-learning' how to behave. The 
political culture as a whole would have to change. There is an established body of scholarship 
suggesting that effective top-down power cannot be purely unilateral, but depends on a degree of 
consent from those being taxed, conscripted or otherwise mobilized.68 The presence of informal 
intermediaries, or middle-men, between state and society contributes to the generation of such 
consent. Islamist political movements in Egypt have for many decades been imbedded within 
webs of informal political interaction in Egypt and prioritised the development of social and 
ideological tools that enable them to present themselves as the 'indispensible' mediators between 
state and society.  They have also played an important role in keeping the avenues of 
communication between state and society informal. 
 In the discussion above we examined the ways in which Egyptian regimes have sustained 
informal patterns of interaction through a politics of neglect, traditionally preferring to leave large 
sections of Egyptian society to their own devices rather than to extend 'legal-rational' bureaucratic 
or institutional structures and norms. Intermediaries like the GI, while offering valuable services 
to the state in the form of outsourced security and control, nevertheless managed to carve out 
spheres of agency for themselves, largely as a result of their ability to mobilise significant 
followings among those disenchanted with the state. The GI thus represents a good example of a 
group created by, dependent on, and to a great extent acting to sustain informal modes of 
interaction. 
 Since its inception in the 1970s one of the defining features of the GI was its strident 
aversion to formalised politics in Egypt. Of course, the group's leaders and members never 
expressed their views, or likely saw things, in this way. Instead, what they opposed were the 
'man-made' laws, or imported doctrines that the regime and their political adversaries in society 
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seemed to be championing. This aversion itself harkened back to seminal Islamist ideologue 
Sayyid Qutb who, previously sympathetic to the modern  project,  was  disillusioned  by  what  he  
saw  as  the  cold formalism of life in the United States. The virtues of the informal (tarahumi), as 
opposed to the formal or 'contractual' (ta'aqudi) have also been extolled by Islamist intellectuals 
like the late Abdel Wahhab Elmessiri, who like Qutb condemned the cold informalism of the 
United States and the West in general, and warned of the dire consequences that would befall 
Egypt if its political and cultural model were accepted whole-cloth.69 
 Groups like the GI, despite extremist pasts, did not evolve in a vacuum but instead 
imbibed and reflected the cultural and political milieu of their times. The GI emerged from the 
Islamic student movement in the 1970s and comprised those elements of the movement that 
eschewed absorption into the Muslim Brotherhood and opposed the latter's strategy of 
accommodation with the Sadat regime. In the 1980s, the group vehemently opposed the 
Brotherhood's participation in elections. But while coming out stridently against these elements of 
'formal' political participation, under the ideological cover of opposition to imported political 
systems or strengthening the kafir regime, the GI was and continued to be linked to the regime via 
informal ties. 
 The Egyptian regime and the Islamist movement in general have a history of cooperation. 
The Muslim Brotherhood was, for two years after the Free Officers seized power in 1952, a 
staunch supporter of the new order and hoped to serve as the new regime's eyes, ears and moral 
compass in society. As Brownlee has pointed out, the MB has always been reluctant to ascend to 
political power, preferring instead to build their capacity in society. Even Hasan al-Banna, in 
running for parliament in 1941, did so in order to extract concessions from the government rather 
than to actually participate in formal politics, as evinced by his quick decision to pull out of the 
race on a prime ministerial pledge to allow the Brotherhood to “resume full-scale operations.”70  
Formal politics, in other words, was sacrificed in favour of and via informal politics. 
 The GI owes its early growth on university campuses to the political space opened up by 
President Anwar Sadat, who far more energetically than he sought to revive parliamentary 
democracy, nurtured Islamists as a counterweight to the left. Many Islamist students joined the 
Brotherhood, while others, specifically in the south, remained in the Gama'a Islamiyya, which 
was distinguished by its muscular social policies. Intra-societal violence, directed against leftist  
activists, Copts and anyone deemed to be acting 'improperly' was sanctioned by the Islamic 
imperative of Enjoining Good and Forbidding Evil.71  But the group's violence did not incredibly 
given the GI's role in the assassination of Sadat put the GI wholly on the wrong side of the 
regime. Mubarak cracked down on those implicated in Sadat's assassination in 1981, but several 
hundred militants were released in 1984. Those that returned to their homes in Upper Egypt, led 
by the so-called '2nd generation' of GI leaders, worked under the 'eyes and ears' of the security 
forces in Upper Egyptian provinces like Asyut and Minya. The governor of Asyut was, until 
1982, none other than Muhammad Uthman Isma'il, who brokered Sadat's experiment with 
bankrolling Islamists in the previous decade.72 
 In Upper Egypt, as with the informal neighbourhoods of Cairo discussed above, the 
influence, and to a large degree presence, of the state were minimal.  Part of what the GI did was 
to substitute for the state's absence by providing social services as well as protection, mediation 
and conflict resolution. There, as in the informal neighbourhoods of Cairo, tribal or familial 
systems of arbitration, conflict resolution had long been breaking down and the GI operated as a 
substitute for those as well as for modern avenues of social and political participation.73  It was 
also the relative absence of the official ulema, as representatives of the state in the south and 
informal neighbourhoods, which led many people to join the Gama'a Islamiyya.74 
 To a great extent the GI and the regime shared a deeply conservative sensibility, wanting 
and fearing similar things. The regime as a whole shared the GI's ambivalence toward 'amoral' or 
subversive behaviour; of large public gatherings deemed to threaten public order, i.e. involving 
dancing, artistic expression, drugs, mixing of the sexes and alcohol.  Local security forces had no 
problem with the GI stepping in to break up such gatherings with force, thus relieving them of the 
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politically costly task of using violence to control behaviour that may or may not have been 
formally illegal. If this politics of risk avoidance, designed to avoid bottom-up opposition to the 
regime, meant a few Copts or students being hurt or killed, then that was seen as a price worth 
paying. 
 The GI's challenge to the state's monopoly on legitimate violence had, as discussed above, 
outlived its usefulness by the early 1990s and by the middle of that decade the coercive capacity 
of the group had been largely eradicated.  In the early 2000s the GI formally renounced militancy 
and sought instead to recover its position as the indispensable mediator between the state and the 
ever-expanding 'Islamic movement' in society. Since then the group has sought to transform itself 
into a 'type of permanent relationship between the Islamic movement and the state.'  By 
empowering the Islamic movement, the GI argues, the state will benefit from the positive energy 
of the Muslim youth in developing society and 'nourishing its morals.’75 
 GI leaders, in common with preachers belonging to the resurgent 'salafi' trend have put 
themselves forward as brokers between the state and society in order to defuse sectarian tensions.  
The cousins Aboud and Tariq al-Zumr have since their release from prison in the wake of the 
January 25 revolution, met with governers of Asyut, Qena and Giza. The governor of Asyut, for 
his part, remarked that 'the Asyut governorate is one of the leading governorates in terms of its 
security regime because of the honourable and wise people of all shades in Asyut, that help us to 
nip any disorder (fitna) in the bud before it spreads,' while adding, perhaps to ward off memories 
of the GI's previous privileged relationship with the security services, that 'we uphold the law over 
everyone equally.’76 
 Senior officers in the new al-Amn al-Watani (national security) service, which replaced 
the widely despised Jihaz Mabahith Amn al-Dawla (national security investigators apparatus), 
openly admit that they have been using Salafi preachers as intermediaries, 'due to their popularity 
with the people' to try and control the Imbaba 'fitna'. In the wake of the violence they also met 
with prominent Islamist figures. These included not only widely respected intellectuals like 
Muhammad Salim al-Awa, but also a number of GI leaders, including Isam Dirbala, Asim Abd al-
Majid, Aboud Zomr, Abd al-Akhir Hamad and Salah Hashim.77 There is clear reluctance within 
the broader intelligentsia to sanction such an approach to governance, and perhaps a realisation 
that such informal channels run the risk of stopping the revolution in its tracks by allowing such 
networks of support and outsourcing to take the place of advances in accountable policing and 
local governance.78 
 
Conclusion 
 
From the foregoing discussion we can make a number of broader contentions. First, it is highly 
problematic to see the state as being in one place and informality “in another”.79 Informality is 
inevitably articulated in a domain demarcated by formal institutions,80 and is most interesting in 
the way that it is diagnostic of the official order's (perhaps hidden) workings. More generally, the 
patrimonial and clientelistic characteristics of the nominally formal Egyptian political order 
complicate any glib attempts at a formal/informal demarcation. Further, 'institutionness' is not 
exclusive to the 'formal sector'. The cases under consideration here are suggestive of informal 
institutions or, at least, patterned 'rules of the game.' For example, informal Cairo's growth and 
development has taken place in a characteristic and routinized way. 
 Finally, the close association of the informal sphere with the state helps explain the 
durability of the Egyptian political order (at least through 2010). While some observers have seen 
informal communities as seeking autonomy from the broader dispensation, politics in informal 
areas have often been about attempts to secure access to state patronage. While the Islamist 
political project in Egypt has often been seen as antagonistic to incumbent rulers, Islamist groups 
have often sought not to challenge state power but rather to seek accommodation with it and even 
act as its intermediary with society.  The extent to which Islamist actors, including the now 
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resurgent Gama'a Islamiyya, succeed in reproducing informality on a large scale with the 
emergent Egyptian regime will tell us much about whether Egypt is passing into a new more 
accountable or democratic phase. 
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